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EFFECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION PROCEEDINGS ON
RELATED LABOR LITIGATION
STEPHEN A. MAZURAK*
The late Dean Roscoe Pound prophetically stated:
[M]ore laws and more administrative regulations are called
for day by day and are being formulated and promulgated in
enormous and continually swelling volume till, in spite of
constantly increasing organization of facilities for finding ap-
plicable precepts, it is beyond the powers of any one man to
know the whole of the body of law.., even in the one juris-
diction in which he judges or administers or practices or
teaches.1
This statement was made more than forty years ago, at the
dawn of the administrative form of government we currently
know. One can only speculate what Dean Pound's comments
would have been had he witnessed today's myriad of legisla-
tive and administrative regulations. The weight of Pound's
statement is nowhere greater felt than in the area of labor
relations.
Employees, unions and employers are daily faced with a
multitude of federal and state legislative and administrative
enactments as they try to go about conducting their business.
For example, what was once entitled a "simple" discharge
case can no longer be so defined. If the employee is within a
collective bargaining unit covered by a collective bargaining
agreement the vast majority of such discharges will be subject
to a grievance procedure ending in arbitration.2 If the em-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Detroit. B.A., University of Nebraska,
1967; J.D., University of Nebraska, 1970.
1. R. PouND, THE TASK OF LAW 63 (1944). This book is the written form of the
North Law Lectures delivered by Dean Pound on January 9, March 4 and April 18,
1941 at Franklin and Marshall College.
2. The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. maintains on file over 5,000 collective bar-
gaining agreements. From a sample of 400 agreements selected on a cross section of
industries, unions, number of employees covered and geographical areas, its survey
showed that 99% of the sample contracts had grievance procedures with 96% of the
agreements providing for arbitration. [1979] 2 COLL. BARG. NEG. & CONT. (BNA)
32:21, 51:1, 51:5.
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ployee is female or a member of a protected minority there
may be a proceeding brought under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.s If the employee claims that one of the
reasons for the discharge related to a "protected activity"
there may be charges or claims filed with the National Labor
Relations Board,' the United States Department of Labor,5 a
state equivalent agency 6 or a proceeding brought directly in a
state court.7 Unless the employee immediately finds new em-
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Title VII].
4. If the charge filed with the National Labor Relations Board claimed that the
action was in violation of the employee's right to engage in protected mutual or "con-
certed" activity pursuant to section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1976) [hereinafter cited as NLRA] it would allege a violation of section 8(a)(1)
of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976). If the charge included the claim that the
discharge was to encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization the pro-
visions of section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976), would be
invoked.
5. A claim filed with the Secretary of Labor could take many forms. For example,
if the employee claims that the discharge was due to a claim by the employee under
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as FLSA], a proceeding by the Secretary of Labor could be instituted for injunctive
relief pursuant to section 17 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1976) alleging a violation
of section 15(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1976). Section 11(a) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 211(a) (1976), authorizes the Administrator of the Department's Wage and Hour
Division to initiate the injunctive remedies of section 17. The 1977 amendments to
the FLSA provided, in part, that an employee could institute a proceeding alleging a
violation of section 15(a)(3) and seek equitable relief, including reinstatement, prior
to any action by the Secretary of Labor. Act of Nov. 1, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-151, § 10,
91 Stat. 1245 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. II 1978)). If the employee claimed
that the discharge was in retaliation for a safety complaint the Secretary of Labor
could institute an action against the employer pursuant to section 11(c) of the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1976). To further confuse
the matter, the National Labor Relations Board has held that in both of these exam-
ples the Board has concurrent power to vindicate the employee's claims under sec-
tions 7 and 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. Moss Planing Mill Co., 103 N.L.R.B. 414, 31
L.R.R.M. 1557 (1953), aff'd, NLRB v. Moss Planing Mill Co., 206 F.2d 557 (4th Cir.
1953) (wage claims asserted under the FLSA); Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999
(1975) (filing of OSHA complaint protected under sections 7 and 8(a)(1) of the
NLRA).
6. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 98.6-.7 (West 1980).
7. For instance, if the employee claims the action was protected under the "public
policy" of the state an action against the employer may lie. Recent cases include
Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3rd Cir. 1979) (discharge al-
leged to have been for failure to take polygraph exam violated public policy of Penn-
sylvania, created cause of action against employer); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980) (termination for refusal to
engage in illegal conduct to fix retail gasoline prices established tort claim as well as
claim for breach of contract); Harless v. First National Bank of Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d
270 (W.Va. 1978) (termination asserted for retaliation for attempts to make employer
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ployment the employee probably will seek to obtain unem-
ployment compensation benefits under applicable state law.8
An employee who has - or feels that he has - suffered a
work related injury arising out of the employment relation-
ship may commence legal proceedings in the appropriate
worker's compensation forum. Each of these adjudicatory
bodies will be involved with the resolution of many of the
same factual disputes in determining whether a violation of a
particular statute has occurred. Each may arrive at findings
which contradict those of another "fact-finder" depending
upon how the matter is presented and upon what the adjudi-
cator determines to be the applicable precepts.
Taking advice from Dean Pound's statement, this article
will be limited to the effects of unemployment compensation
comply with consumer credit protection laws stated claim). Many public policy claims
for restriction of unlimited right to terminate an employee arise out of a claimed
violation of a misdemeanor criminal statute protecting against a retaliatory act by the
employer because an employee filed a claim for statutory benefits such as worker's
compensation. See, Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 MII. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1979);
Raden v. City of Azusa, 97 Cal. App. 3d 336, 158 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1978); Lally v.
Copygraphics, 173 N.J. Super. 162, 413 A.2d 960 (1980). For an in depth study of the
general right of an employee to be protected from unjust discharge, see Peck, Unjust
Discharges From Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, OHIO ST. L.J. 1
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Peck]. See also, Peck, Some Kind of Hearing for Persons
Discharged for Private Employment, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 313 (1979). Professor
Summers has suggested that the existing corps of arbitrators could be used to adjudi-
cate the employee's unjust discharge claims. Summers, Individual Protection Against
Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. Rav. 481 (1976). Professor Summers,
as the title of the article infers, suggests that a statute be enacted in order to protect
employees from unjust discharge. Professor Peck urges that existing concepts of con-
stitutional law may be applied to reach the same result. The United States stands
apart from most Western European countries which provide protection for employees
against unjust dismissal. Id. at 508. Stieber, Protection Against Unfair Dismissal: A
Comparative View, 3 Comp. LAB. L. 229 (1980).
8. Each of the fifty states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, and the Virgin Islands has enacted unemployment compensation provisions in
accordance with Subchapter III of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-504
(1976), and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1976). The
most comprehensive compilation of the differences and similarities of these fifty-
three statutes is published semiannually by the Unemployment Insurance Service of
the Employment and Training Administration of the United States Department of
Labor. This compilation is entitled CoMPAusON oF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
LAW [hereinafter cited as U.S. DP'T LABOR - COMPARISON]. The comparison exam-
ines eight major subject areas: (1) coverage, (2) taxation, (3) benefits, (4) eligibility,
(5) administration, (6) disability, (7) federal claims, and (8) readjustment allowances.
U.S. DEP'T LABOR - COMPARISON, supra, at iv. See also, Chupp, Changes in Unem-
ployment Insurance Legislation During 1979, 103 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 36 (Apr. 1980).
1980]
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proceedings upon potential claims brought before three fo-
rums of labor litigation: proceedings before the National La-
bor Relations Board, actions instituted under Title VII before
federal district courts and matters submitted to arbitration
under a collective bargaining agreement." After an initial brief
examination of the general statutory scheme of unemploy-
ment compensation insurance as enacted by the various
states, the article will analyze certain procedural effects of un-
employment compensation proceedings on subsequent labor
litigation. The substantive effects of unemployment compen-
sation proceedings on this subsequent labor litigation will be
examined next. The article will conclude with some thoughts
on homogenization of the interrelationship of unemployment
compensation proceedings with the subsequent labor
litigation.
I. THE STATUTORY SCHEME OF UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION PROCEEDINGS
Unemployment compensation benefits in American labor
relations are of relatively recent vintage. The concept of pay-
ment of benefits to workers who were unemployed originated
in the trade labor movement in the mid-nineteenth century.10
9. Hereinafter collectively referred to as "subsequent labor litigation." The unem-
ployment compensation proceedings are used as the touchstone of comparison with
the subsequent labor litigation because in a vast majority of the cases the former
proceeding will be concluded prior to the hearing on one or more of the other pro-
ceedings. This will not be the case, of course, in every situation; the reverse may be
true or the two proceedings may conclude at the same time. See note 130 infra, and
Yellow Cab Co., 44 Lab. Arb. 445 (1965) (Jones, Arb.) discussed in note 72, infra.
Most of the fifty-three unemployment compensation jurisdictions do not publish
their decisions for general distribution. National publications, such as Commerce
Clearing House, do compile some of the more important decisions which come to
their attention. Some of the agencies, such as the California Unemployment Insur-
ance Appeals Board, do publish decisions which may be used as precedent for future
cases. Many arbitrators, either because of personal beliefs or because of the desires of
the parties they serve, do not submit their decisions for publication. The lack of a
complete reporting system of all decisions leaves a wide gap in the available informa-
tion. For this reason alone it is impossible to conduct an empirical study, even as
limited above, of the effects of unemployment compensation proceedings upon the
defined subsequent labor litigation. Because of these limitations the author intends
this article to be the commencement of discussion of this matter, not its conclusion.
10. Larson & Murray, The Development of Unemployment Insurance in the
United States, 8 VAND. L. Rav. 181, 182 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Larson &
Murray].
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Several European countries toward the end of the nineteenth
and the beginning of the twentieth century began subsidizing
these voluntary union plans. Great Britain created the first
compulsory unemployment insurance law in 1911 covering
only the building, engineering and shipbuilding industries.11
By 1920 all manual workers and certain non-manual workers
were covered by the act.
In the United States a federal system of unemployment
compensation benefits was not established until 1935. At the
time of the passage of the original Social Security Act 12 only
Wisconsin had passed a state statutory scheme of unemploy-
ment insurance.13 While some states had considered such leg-
islation, it had been defeated primarily upon the basis that
employers would be placed on an uncompetitive scale with
employers in other states which had not enacted similar legis-
lation.14 Because of this type of opposition, it became appar-
ent to the proponents of unemployment compensation that
federal legislation was necessary.
As a result of many forces, including a real fear about the
constitutionality of the law,15 a system of federal-state cooper-
ative unemployment programs was established. 6 A federal tax
credit was enacted which permitted employers to receive up to
a 90 percent credit against their federal tax liability.17 By the
date of the provisions of the Social Security Act effecting un-
employment compensation tax payments all but two states
had enacted state legislation providing for the credit. This
"carrot-stick" approach of state-federal administration of the
unemployment compensation programs continues to date.
Unlike the "flat" or standardized programs of England,
11. Larson & Murray, supra note 10. See also Witte, Development of Unemploy-
ment Compensation, 55 YALE L.J. 21, 22 (1945) [hereinafter cited as Witte].
12. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
13. Witte, supra note 11, at 27; Larson & Murray, supra note 10, at 185.
14. Witte, supra note 11, at 28; Larson & Murray, supra note 10, at 185.
15. The constitutionality of the law was upheld by a five to four decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548
(1937).
16. Witte, supra note 11, at 30.
17. Even though the current federal tax may rise to 3.4% based upon outstanding
advances in the federal extended unemployment compensation account of the state,
the total credit to employers remains at 90% of 3.0% as originally enacted. U.S.
DmE'T LABOR - COMPARISON, supra note 8, at 2-1.
19801
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which provided for a system of equal benefit amounts, the
American state laws, from their inception have provided a sys-
tem for benefits which vary as a proportion of wages, subject
to minimum and maximum amounts.18 More significantly, the
method of financing the .programs differs from that used by
the European countries. In most of those countries the em-
ployees as well as the employers made contributions to the
program. In the United States, however, employee contribu-
tions initially were only required in ten states.19 Currently,
only three states require employee contributions. ° Another
unique characteristic of the American style of unemployment
compensation is that employers are charged lower unemploy-
ment compensation amounts if their record of unemployment
is low. Each state system provides for this "experience rating"
based upon the history of the employer, 2' although the
amount, type and calculation of the credit vary from state to
state. While there are five basic types of experience rating22
all systems have common characteristics. All measure and
compare, in one way or another, the employer's experience
with unemployment with its benefit costs. This ratio is com-
pared with a measure of exposure, such as payrolls, to deter-
mine relative exposure for small and large employers. 3
Since the federal government has left to the states the par-
ticular ground rules upon which benefits will be paid - sub-
ject only to constitutional due process concepts24 and the gen-
eral requirements of the Social Security Act 25 - each state
18. Larson & Murray, supra note 10, at 183.
19. Id.
20. These states are Alabama, Alaska and New Jersey. New Jersey and Alabama
require an employee contribution of 0.5%, but Alabama requires the contribution
only when the fund is below the minimum normal amount. Alaska requires an em-
ployee contribution between 0.3 to 0.8%, depending upon the rate schedule in effect.
U.S. DEP'T LABOR - COMPARISON, supra note 8, at 2-2.
21. Id. at 2-4. Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands do not have a system of experi-
ence rating.
22. These systems are commonly known as reserve-ratio, benefit-wage-ratio, com-
pensable-separations, and payroll-decline formulas. The reserve ratio is the most pop-
ular and is used by 32 states. This formula is based on cost accounting principles. Id.
at 2-5. An additional explanation of the systems of experience rating may be found in
[1976] 1B UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) 1120.
23. U.S. DEP'T LABOR - COMPARISON, supra note 8, at 2-5.
24. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (procedural due process require-
ments applicable to statutory program of welfare payments).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 503(a) (1976) imposes several requirements upon a state plan in-
[Vol. 64:133
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has established its own method of determining benefit pay-
ments. This differentiation of benefit determination between
the states has led some individuals to call for a unification of
the programs under the direction of the federal government.28
A discussion of the relative merits of these calls to unify the
programs is not within the scope of this article. The current
differentiation does render, however, a comprehensive com-
parison of all of the programs of the fifty states, the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands and the District of
Columbia beyond the space limitations of this format. Accord-
ingly, this article will suggest certain precepts and suggested
usage; however, the practitioner, educator or interested ob-
server need consult carefully and completely the practice in
the particular jurisdiction of interest to obtain a thoroughly
accurate picture of the particular problem at issue. Certain
trends do come forth, however, when the problems and inter-
relationships of unemployment compensation proceedings on
subsequent labor litigation are considered in the abstract. For
convenience - while recognizing the hazards of any labeling
endeavor 7 - these concepts have been separated into proce-
dural and substantive effects.
cluding the requirement in subsection (3) that an individual whose claim for unem-
ployment compensation is denied be provided the opportunity for a fair hearing
before an impartial tribunal. 26 U.S.C. § 3304 (1976) makes additional demands upon
the state plan. While the original Social Security Act provided for only six such re-
quirements, the current statute has seventeen subsections and numerous require-
ments. 26 U.S.C. § 3304 (Supp. 1979). These requirements vary from the innocuous
(the state shall reserve the power to amend or repeal the law at anytime) to the spe-
cific (an undocumented worker who is not lawfully in the United States is not enti-
tled to benefits).
26. Statement of Sol Chaikin before the National Commission on Unemployment
Compensation reported in NAT. COMM'N UNEMP. CoMP., BASIC STRUCTURE OF A FED-
ERAL-STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROGRAM 370-71 (Nov. 1979) [hereinafter
cited as Chaikin Statement]. Mr. Chaikin quotes a report of the Comptroller General
of the United States calling for uniform eligibility requirements. See also U.S. CoMP-
TROLLER GENERAL, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE - NEED TO REDUCE UNEQUAL TREAT-
MENT OF CLAIMANT AND IMPROVE BENEFIT PAYMENT CONTROLS AND TAX COLLECTIONS
21 (1978).
27. The task of placing labels on any type of legal endeavor, particularly as to
whether an item is procedural or substantive, is frustrating, at best. At worst, it is
impossible. Similar to the trial judge whose final finding of fact is always that "if any
of these findings be deemed conclusions of law they are to be found to be conclusions
of law" and whose final conclusion of law is always the converse, the author acknowl-
edges that his categorization of procedural and substantive elements may not fit an-
other person's label.
1980]
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II. PROCEDURAL EFFECTS
In the examination of the procedural effects of unemploy-
ment compensation proceedings upon subsequent labor litiga-
tion the use of the example of discharge previously mentioned
will be used as a paradigm. The paradigm of discharge is not
intended to indicate that other factual settings do not have
equal or greater significance; rather it is meant only as a vehi-
cle to compare the relationship of unemployment compensa-
tion proceedings with other labor proceedings. Many of the
factors discussed in this comparison will apply equally to the
interrelationship, inter se, between the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, the equal employment and the arbitration
proceedings.
A. The Unemployment Proceedings as a Discovery Device
One of the sacrosanct secrets of labor law practitioners in
discussing unemployment compensation proceedings is their
use of it as a discovery tool to further the parties' positions in
any future proceedings. Discussion of this issue is virtually
non-existent, although experienced labor law practitioners
daily use the proceedings for this purpose. As a practical mat-
ter this constitutes one of the primary functions of the unem-
ployment compensation proceedings as they relate to subse-
quent labor litigation.28
The National Labor Relations Board in its unfair labor
practice proceedings 29 has long precluded the use of discovery
devices available in the federal rules of civil procedure. °
While the investigating Board agent will reveal the basic facts
supporting a charge to the respondent in a case, the purpose
of such disclosure is to facilitate settlement not to educate the
respondent.3 1 Even though this "trial by ambush" has re-
ceived criticism by such prestigious organizations as the
28. This is particularly true in light of the limited preclusive effect of the unem-
ployment compensation proceeding discussed in the text accompanying notes 49-50,
infra.
29. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976).
30. Del E. Webb Const. Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 377 n.2 (1951); Lyman Printing & Fin-
ishing Co., 183 N.L.R.B. 1048 n.2, 1055-58 (1970), enforced, 437 F.2d 1356 (4th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 829 (1971). See generally Garvey, Prehearing Discovery
in NLRB Proceedings, 26 LAB. L.J. 710 (1975).
31. NLRB CASEHANDLING MANUAL, V% 10128.2 (1976).
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Chairman's Task Force on the National Labor Relations
Board, 2 there is no indication that the Board's procedures
will change. While practitioners tried to by-pass this hurdle to
pre-hearing discovery by the use of the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act 33 and achieved limited success in lower courts, 4 the
United States Supreme Court has laid to rest the idea that
the FOIA permitted a respondent to obtain pre-hearing dis-
covery of the general counsel's case in an unfair labor practice
proceeding.3 5
Returning to our paradigm, the unemployment compensa-
tion hearing can serve a useful purpose for the employee, or
the union if the employee is so represented, to discover the
basis of the discharge. The employer may use the proceeding
to ascertain the basis of the employee's claim of protected ac-
tivity. Most of the states in their scheme of benefit determina-
tion provide for the issuance of subpeonas ad testificandum or
duces tecum to gather evidence for the determination hear-
ing. The evidence is taken under oath and a court reporter
or recording device is used to memorialize testimony.3 7 Thus,
the employee may obtain the testimony of the employer rep-
resentatives well in advance of the National Labor Relations
Board's proceeding which will enable preparation of the em-
ployee's defense to any employer's claim that the discharge
was for cause under the National Labor Relations Act.3 ' Simi-
32. 1976 Interim Report and Recommendations of the Chairman's Task Force on
the NLRB, [1976] L A. REL. Y.B. (BNA) 327, 348-52. It should be noted that the
Task Force was divided in its view on discovery. The Final Report of the Task Force,
[1977] LaB. REL. Y.B. (BNA) 329 did not modify this position.
33. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976) [hereinafter cited as FOIA].
34. Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB, 407 F. Supp. 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 534
F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976).
35. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214 (1978) (prehearing affida-
vit of witness taken by General Counsel not subject to disclosure pursuant to the
FOIA).
36. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1953 (West 1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, §
500 (Smith-Hurd 1980); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 421.9 (1978); Vis. STAT. ANN. §
108.14 (West 1980).
37. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1952 (West 1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, §
504 (Smith-Hurd 1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 108.09(5)(b) (West 1980). Other states
require the memorialization of testimony through their administrative procedures act
or by regulations issued by the unemployment commission agency.
38. Pursuant to the provisions of section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976), the Board is without power to reinstate or award back
pay to an employee who has been discharged or suspended for cause.
1980]
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larly, the employer will be able to obtain in advance an idea of
the positions the employee may possibly assert before the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board.
Labor arbitrators are as reluctant to permit pre-hearing
discovery as is the National Labor Relations Board. In some
jurisdictions the arbitrators are precluded by statute from
permitting discovery unless both parties consent to the pro-
cess.39 Where not precluded by statute most arbitrators, ab-
sent consent of the parties, will not permit discovery proceed-
ings. These arbitrators feel, inter alia, that such proceedings
are most unwise, inappropriate and contrary to the basic ten-
ets of arbitration to keep costs at a minimum and expedite
the proceedings without undue delay. 0 Because of this policy
39. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1283 (West 1976); §§ 1283.05, 1282.2 (West 1980); §
1283.1 (West 1972). Section 1283 is limited to depositions "for use as evidence and
not for discovery." Section 1282.2(a)(2) providing for witness and document lists does
not apply to "matters arising out of collective-bargaining agreements." States enact-
ing the Uniform Arbitration Act provide in section 7(b) that arbitrators may permit
depositions "of a witness who cannot be subpoenaed or is unable to attend the hear-
ing." Thus, the use of the discovery deposition would not be permitted. Many of the
states enacting the Uniform Arbitration Act have excluded agreements to arbitrate
between employers and employees from the coverage even though the model act ex-
pressly includes such matters. 7 UNIFoRM ARBITRATION ACT 4-6. See, e.g., MICH.
Comp. LAWS ANN. § 600.5001(3) (1968). Similarly, some states exclude labor relations
matters from applicabld arbitration statutes. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 788.01, 111.10 (West
1980). In Layton School of Art & Design v. Wis. Emp. Rel. Comm'n, 82 Wis. 2d 324,
262 N.W.2d 218 (1978), the Wisconsin Supreme Court interpreted the predecessor of
§ 788.01 to mean that an arbitrator selected from a list of arbitrators provided by the
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission was an arbitrator acting pursuant to
statute, not common law. Accordingly, it could be argued that arbitrators selected
from lists supplied by the state commission possess the authority to provide for depo-
sitions pursuant to Wis. STAT. § 788.07. Other jurisdictions specifically permit arbi-
trators to allow depositions for discovery. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 167 (Purdon 1963).
See generally, 0. FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 121-
31 (1973) [hereinafter cited as FAIRWEATHER].
40. Jones, Blind Man's Bluff and the NOW - Problems of Apocrypha, Inc. and
Local 711 - Discovery Procedures in Collective Bargaining Disputes, 116 U. PA. L.
REV. 571, 576 n.6 (1968). Professor Jones in this article and two subsequent articles
stresses the importance of arbitral discovery in appropriate cases, the interrelation-
ship of the National Labor Relations Board, the courts and arbitration in this process
and the legal foundation upon which discovery may be based. Jones, The Accretion of
Federal Power in Labor Arbitration - The Example of Arbitral Discovery, 116 U.
PA. L. REv. 830 (1968); Jones, The Labor Board, The Courts, and Arbitration - a
Feasibility Study of Tribunal Interaction in Grievable Refusals to Disclose, 116 U.
PA. L. REV. 1185 (1968). See also E. ELKOURI & F. ELKOURI, How Arbitration Works
8-10, 22-23 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as ELKOURI & ELKOURI] on the advantages
of the minimum cost and expeditious proceedings of arbitration as compared with
[Vol. 64:133
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of no pre-hearing discovery, the unemployment compensation
proceedings may have the collateral effect of a party obtaining
valuable information about the other parties' claims and evi-
dence while in the process of determining the question of enti-
tlement to unemployment compensation benefits.
In the area of equal employment opportunity litigation,
the pre-trial value of the unemployment compensation pro-
ceedings has less weight due to the discovery devices available
to the litigants in the federal courts pursuant to the federal
rules of civil procedure.41 The unemployment compensation
proceedings may still be of value to a litigant if the equal em-
ployment charge is still in the investigation stages of the pro-
ceedings.42 If a party is able to adduce evidence through the
unemployment compensation proceedings which establishes
the position it seeks, the evidence could have the collateral
purpose of assisting in the establishment of the necessary
findings by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
that reasonable cause exists to believe that a prohibited act of
discrimination occurred, or, in the alternative, that the charge
should be dismissed for lack of evidence of unlawful motive.3
A second purpose of discovery is to "lock-in" testimony of
witnesses so that their testimony cannot be changed at any
subsequent trial or hearing. The unemployment compensation
proceedings are an additional aid to counsel in this respect.
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that where a witness
has testified in a prior hearing, and that statement is inconsis-
tent with the present testimony, the prior testimony may be
used to impeach the witness.44 Most states provide similar evi-
dentiary rules.45 While the federal rule is subject to require-
traditional litigation.
41. FED. R. Cxv. P. 33-37.
42. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.15(a) (1979) provides, in part, that the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission will accept any evidence a party may wish to provide rele-
vant to the charges made.
43. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19 (1979) (dismissal) and 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21 (1979) (reason-
able cause determination).
44. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) and (d)(2); see also FED. R. EvID. 613(b) on provid-
ing the witness the opportunity to explain the prior statement. An example of a state
court permitting the use of prior testimony of a witness in an unemployment compen-
sation proceeding for the purposes of cross examination see Sias v. General Motors
Corp., 372 Mich. 542, 548-49, 127 N.W.2d 357, 361 (1964).
45. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 254 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCoR-
MICK, EVIDENCE].
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ments of oath, the opportunity to cross-examine, identity of
the parties and issues, and an examination of the character of
the tribunal and the proceedings, 4 the unemployment com-
pensation proceedings appear to qualify as such a proceeding
for which prior testimony could be used. Moreover, where the
witness is unavailable at the time of the second proceeding,
damaging testimony (or helpful testimony) could be used
upon proof of the unavailability of the witness. 47
Through the use of subpoenas the party to an unemploy-
ment compensation proceeding could require the key wit-
nesses on the other side to appear and testify. Once the unem-
ployment compensation proceedings have concluded and the
testimony is completed, the advocate can determine whether
to call the witness to the subsequent labor litigation proceed-
ing. Even if the witness' testimony is not useful in proving the
subsequent case, the testimony in the unemployment compen-
sation proceeding is still useful to evaluate the likelihood of
success in the subsequent labor litigation. Furthermore, it
may be used for impeachment purposes if the witness recants
the story at the subsequent hearing. Thus, the unemployment
compensation proceeding serves as a valuable discovery device
in subsequent labor litigation where discovery is not normally
available.
B. Preclusive Effect of the Unemployment Compensation
Proceeding
The preclusive effect of unemployment compensation pro-
ceedings on subsequent labor litigation is, perhaps, the most
troublesome and, yet, potentially the most useful procedural
effect. Those arguing a preclusive effect urge that once the is-
sue of termination has been decided the matter should be laid
to rest. For example, an employer may claim that the termi-
nation of an employee was because the employee stole goods
from the employer. The employee claims that the termination
was due to union or other protected activity. The unemploy-
ment administrative law judge (ALJ) finds that the employee
was terminated because of protected activity and not theft.
Should this finding of fact have preclusive effect in subse-
46. Id. at §§ 255-58.
47. Id. at § 253; FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
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quent labor litigation? The answer is relatively easy. In most
state unemployment compensation proceedings the claim by
the employer if proved would disqualify the employee from
benefits because of "misconduct. '48 Since the ALJ found that
the employee had been terminated due to protected activity
no misconduct would be found. But the finding of protected
activity was not essential to the finding that misconduct did
not occur. All the ALJ needed to find was that the reason for
discharge was not theft. Once this was found the real reason
for discharge was immaterial to the decision of the ALJ, no
misconduct having been found. Thus, the decision that the ac-
tions of the employee involved protected conduct was unnec-
essary for adjudication. It should not have a preclusive
effect.49
48. U.S. DEP'T LABOR - COMPARISON, supra note 8, at 4-7 & 4-8.
49. Any examination of preclusive effect must first come to grips with terminol-
ogy. As used in this article the terms "preclusion" or "preclusive effect" are defined
to encompass the common concepts of res judicata and collateral estoppel as set forth
in 1B J. MooRE FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 0.441-.448 (2d ed. 1976). While res judicata may
not be applicable to any appreciable degree in the present comparison because the
"cause of action" is different in an unemployment compensation proceeding than in
the subsequent labor litigation, "fact" or "issue" preclusion of collateral estoppel may
be applicable. Id. at 0.441[2]. Accordingly, the trier of fact in the subsequent labor
litigation may be estopped from resolving factual disputes already resolved in the
unemployment compensation proceedings. This does not mean that the trier of fact
in the subsequent labor litigation should not apply those "resolved" facts in its own
decision. That, of course, is the function reserved for the later tribunal.
The later tribunal has the additional responsibility of determining whether the
party arguing the preclusive effect of the prior proceeding has fulfilled its burden of
proof on the issue. Id. at 0.408[1]. In the text example, the employer should be
precluded from raising in the second proceeding that the employee was discharged for
theft, that matter having been adversely decided against it. However, it does not nec-
essarily follow that the employer violated the employee's right to engage in protected
activity. That issue was not essential to the judgment in the unemployment compen-
sation proceeding. Thus, the second tribunal must decide whether the employee's
protected rights were violated. Id. at 1 0.433[5].
The second tribunal could, of course, review the employer's claims in the unem-
ployment proceedings to determine whether the employer is maintaining an inconsis-
tent position in the second proceeding. See notes 44-47 supra and accompanying text.
The second tribunal could, on the basis of prior inconsistent testimony, impose the
sanction of preclusion. Id. at 1 0.405[8]. The second tribunal must also examine the
identity of the parties, the nature of the controversy and the nature of the adjudicat-
ing bodies in making a decision on the preclusive nature of the prior proceeding.
Vestal, PreclusionRes Judicata Variables: Adjudicating Bodies, 54 GEO. L. REV.
857, 861 & nn.14 & 15 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Vestal - Adjudicating Bodies]. A
special problem arises concerning preclusion when National Labor Relations Board
matters are involved. Since the General Counsel controls the litigation and prosecutes
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A more difficult case occurs when the employee quits em-
ployment because of discriminatory treatment. This concept
of "constructive discharge" could result because of union ac-
tivity or because of other matters such as sexual harassment.50
In this hypothetical the unemployment compensation pro-
ceeding must resolve whether the employee had good or just
cause to quit the employment. 1 If the employer litigated this
matter, and lost, it would appear that the traditional concept
of collateral estoppel should apply, at least to the finding of
fact of the employee's reason for leaving employment.52 If that
the claim from both a public and private perspective, the Board will have to consider
carefully the concept of issue preclusion as it relates to identity of parties. Preclusion
does not require an identity of parties in all instances. Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judi-
cata Variables: Parties, 50 IOWA L. REV. 27 passim (1964). The United States Court
of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, applied the principle of preclusion where in the first pro-
ceeding the actions of an employee resulted in union liability for violating §
8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA, by precluding the General Counsel in the second proceeding
(same employee, same facts) from claiming a violation of § 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
NLRA against the employer. Mosher Steel Co. v. NLRB, 568 F.2d 436 (5th Cir.
1978).
Administrative agency determination and its effect on subsequent litigation has
been explored in a plethora of treatises and articles. 2 K. DAVIs, ADM. LAW TREATISE
§§ 18.01-.12 (1958); K. DAVIS, ADM. LAW OF THE SEVENrIs §§ 18.01-.06 (1976); Davis,
Res Judicata in Administrative Law, 25 TEx. L. REV. 199 (1947); Groner & Stern-
stein, Res Judicata in Federal Administrative Law, 39 IOWA L. REV. 300 (1954). More
recent articles include Mogel, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in Administra-
tive Proceedings, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 463 (1978); Note, The Preclusive Effect of State
Agency Findings in Federal Agency Proceedings, 64 IOWA L. REV. 339 (1979).
50. The concept of constructive discharge, i.e., creation by the employer of a situ-
ation so unbearable that an employee relinquishes his position rather than continue
in such situation, has been uniformly recognized by the National Labor Relations
Board, the courts in equal employment opportunity matters and by arbitrators. Balti-
more Transit Co., 47 N.L.R.B. 109, 112, 12 L.R.R.M. 1, 3 (1943); Young v. Southwest-
ern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975); I.U.D.S. - Midwest, Inc. 68
Lab. Arb. 962 (1977) (Cox, Arb.). On the application of unemployment compensation
to claims of sexual harassment see Comment, Unemployment Compensation Benefits
for the Victim of Work-Related Sexual Harassment, 3 HARV. WOMEN L.J. 173 (1980).
51. States use different standards to determine the validity of the reason for quit-
ting work. "Good," "just," "sufficient cause" or "cause of a necessitous and compel-
ling nature" are standards used by different states. U.S. DEP'T LABOR - COMPARISON,
supra note 8, at 4-5 through 4-7.
52. In this example, a necessary finding of fact by the unemployment compensa-
tion tribunal is that the sexual harassment took place. If it did not, then the termina-
tion was voluntary and the individual would not be entitled to unemployment com-
pensation. If the harassment did take place the employee would be entitled to receive
unemployment compensation because the quit was "for cause." The finding of harass-
ment should be final and binding on the employer. The second tribunal need only
take this finding and apply it to the statute (or contract) involved to determine
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reason were sufficient to sustain a finding of a violation of the
law (or contract) in the subsequent labor litigation, the second
tribunal should give preclusive effect to the finding. A similar
result should occur where, under our previous example of
claimed employee theft, the unemployment compensation
tribunal finds that the employee has been discharged because
of misconduct. Under this situation the employee should not
enjoy a second opportunity to prove that the theft did not oc-
cur or was not the reason for the discharge.
This concept of the preclusive effect of unemployment
compensation proceedings on subsequent labor litigation,
however, is far from settled. The United States Supreme
Court has clearly stated that administrative proceedings may
form the basis of preclusive effect on subsequent court pro-
ceedings. In the Court's decision in United States v. Utah
Construction & Mining Co.53 the Court - although not essen-
tial to its decision - stated:
When an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capac-
ity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it
which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to liti-
gate, the courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to
enforce repose .... See also Goldstein v. Doft, 236 F.Supp.
730, aff'd 353 F.2d 484, cert. denied, 383 U.S. 960, where
collateral estoppel was applied to prevent relitigation of fac-
tual disputes resolved by an arbitrator."
Contrasted with this strong endorsement of the use of preclu-
sive principles to enforce repose is the Court's decision in Al-
exander v. Gardner-Denver Co.
55
In the Alexander decision the employee had been dis-
charged for claimed production deficiencies. The matter had
proceeded through the grievance steps. In the final pre-arbi-
tration step the grievant raised, apparently for the first time,
the claim that his discharge was because of racial discrimina-
tion.56 Prior to the formal arbitration proceeding the grievant
filed a charge with the appropriate state agency claiming ra-
whether a violation has occurred. The issue of the discrimination should not have to
be relitigated anew. See note 49 supra.
53. 384 U.S. 394 (1966).
54. Id. at 422.
55. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
56. Id. at 42.
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cial discrimination. The arbitration proceeded. The grievant
testified that his discharge was due to racial discrimination.
The arbitrator found that there was just cause to terminate
the grievant, but did not refer explicitly to the discrimination
claim. 57 The district court held that the grievant, by submit-
ting his claim to the arbitrator, was precluded from litigating
the claim under Title VII58 The Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit affirmed in a per curiam opinion.5
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the arbitration
proceeding did not preclude the Title VII proceeding. As ap-
propriate to the present examination, it specifically found that
the theory of preclusion, whether cast as election of remedies,
equitable estoppel, res judicata or collateral estoppel, could
not be applied because the national policy reasons against dis-
crimination required the rejection of such a concept.8 0 While
the reasoning of the Court may be subject to criticism,"1 there
can be little doubt that under the Alexander rationale a prior
adjudication by an unemployment compensation hearing will
not preclude a subsequent proceeding for a violation of Title
VII. The Court did permit the federal courts to use the prior
arbitration proceeding for a type of quasi-preclusive effect, al-
lowing the arbitrator's decision to be introduced into "evi-
dence and accorded such weight as the court deems appropri-
ate." 2 This, of course, is not unlike the procedure that any
court may be required to perform in an examination of the
preclusive effect of any prior proceeding,"3 except the court
under the Alexander rationale will be able to ignore any
preclusive effect if it views the facts differently from the
arbitrator."
The National Labor Relations Board has had a similar ad-
57. Id.
58. 346 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Colo. 1971).
59. 466 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972).
60. 415 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1974).
61. Meltzer, The Impact of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver on Labor Arbitration,
N.Y.U. TWENTY-SEVENTH ANN. CONF. ON LAB. 189, 191-93 (1974).
62. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at 60.
63. See note 49 supra and 1B J. MOORE FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.408[1] (1976).
64. In the Alexander case the district court on remand determined that the dis-
charge was proper, which determination was affirmed by the court of appeals. Alexan-
der v. Gardner-Denver Co., 519 F.2d 503 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1058
(1976).
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version to giving preclusive effect to prior arbitration proceed-
ings. The Board has deferred to an arbitrator's award so long
as that award has fulfilled certain criteria, 5 but recently has
made it more difficult to use a prior arbitration award to pre-
vent the relitigation of the factual dispute in the unfair labor
practice forum.66 As with Title VII proceedings, the same ef-
fect can be expected in a proceeding where the unemployment
compensation proceeding is asserted as binding on the Board
proceeding.67
Arbitrators have been more willing to accept the preclusive
effect of prior factual determinations, 8 although the consen-
sus is anything but unanimous.6 9 Some arbitrators accept the
65. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1955). The
Spielberg test requires that the arbitration proceedings be fair and regular. All par-
ties must agree to be bound and the arbitration decision must not be clearly repug-
nant to the purposes and policies of the National Labor Relations Act. Id. at 1082, 36
L.R.R.M. at 1153.
66. Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 103 L.R.R.M. 1113 (Jan. 8,
1980). In Suburban, the Board overruled Electronic Reproduction Service Corp., 213
N.L.R.B. 758, 87 L.R.R.M. 1211, (1974) which held that in the absence of unusual
circumstances the Board would defer to an arbitrator's award even though the arbi-
trator had not indicated that he had considered or been presented with the unfair
labor practice issue. The Board stated that it was returning to its pre-Electronic Re-
production rule that a deferral would not result unless the unfair labor practice issue
before the Board was both presented to and considered by the arbitrator.
67. This is the position taken by the Board in those few cases in which it has
considered the matter. Aerovox Corp., 104 N.L.R.B. 246, 247, 32 L.R.R.M. 1078, 1079
(1953) (dictum); Cadillac Marine & Boat Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 107, 108 n.1 (1956) (Mich-
igan Employment Security Commission decision not a bar to Board proceeding; ad-
mitted for its probative value); W.K. Mfg. Co., 161 N.L.R.B. 1185, 1189 n.18 (1966)
(trial examiner's decision). The Board does recognize that testimony adduced at the
unemployment compensation proceeding may be used for impeachment purposes as
long as the appropriate guidelines are followed. Newport Window Cleaning Co., Inc.,
170 N.L.R.B. 1221 n.2, 1227 n.28 (1968). See note 44 supra. At least two of the mem-
bers of the Board (Messrs. Fanning and Jenkins) believe that the rationale of Alexan-
der requires the Board to abandon the deferral policy in toto. Roy Robinson, Inc., 228
N.L.R.B. 828, 835, 94 L.R.R.M. 1474, 1481 (1977) (dissenting opinion).
68. Hygrade Food Products Corp., 73 Lab. Arb. 755 (1979) (Chiesa, Arb.) (princi-
ple recognized but not applied because of different issues); Bofors-Lakeway, Inc., 72
Lab. Arb. 159 (1979) (Kelman, Arb.) (prior arbitration held to be binding); Timken
Roller Bearing Co., 32 Lab. Arb. 595 (1958) (Boehm, Arb.) (rule of preclusion ac-
cepted, but case distinguished on facts); Wheeling Steel Corp., 25 Lab. Arb. 68 (1955)
(Shipman, Arb.) (acceptance as binding, finding of worker's compensation commis-
sion); Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 7 Lab. Arb. 563 (1947) (Copelof, Arb.) (testi-
mony before worker's compensation court was binding on grievant).
69. Floor Covering Specialists, Inc., 68 Lab. Arb. 1022 (1977) (Finston, Arb.)
(NLRB proceeding not binding since arbitration is a substitute for litigation); Fawn
Eng'r Corp., 63 Lab. Arb. 1307 (1974) (Fitch, Arb.) (unemployment compensation
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preclusive principles of the prior adjudication, setting forth
conditions which must be fulfilled prior to acceptance of the
prior award.70 Other arbitrators deny the binding effect, but
look to the prior decision and adopt it unless "clearly
wrong. '71 Still other arbitrators treat each matter as a new
decision and totally ignore any preclusive effect.1 2
The hesitation of the courts and the administrative bodies
to adopt the-preclusive principles of res judicata and collateral
estoppel and to deny litigants the opportunity "to blow hot
and cold '7 .3 with respect to the same transaction should not
discourage the parties from raising the defense in the appro-
priate circumstances. Whether the use of the defense is
finding not binding although sworn testimony was used); Reynolds Metals Co., 59
Lab. Arb. 64 (1972) (Welch, Arb.) (unemployment compensation finding not binding
on arbitrator); Union-Tribune Publishing Co., 51 Lab. Arb. 421 (1968) (Jones, Arb.)
(determination by unemployment compensation claims examiner of no decisional
consequence to arbitrator). See generally ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 40, at 373-
74, and FAIRWEATHER, supra note 39, at 211-13.
70. Bofors-Lakeway, Inc., 72 Lab. Arb. 159, 163 (1979) (Kelman, Arb.). Arbitrator
Kelman set forth four rules to determine whether the first arbitrator's award should
be accepted without reexamination by the subsequent arbitrator. These were (1) the
contract issue in contention was central to the earlier arbitration, (2) the parties had
a fair and adequate opportunity to make their case before the first arbitrator, (3) the
ruling of the first arbitrator is clear and explicit, and (4) the previous ruling, though
it is unpersuasive to the current arbitrator, is something that the losing party can
endure. For a thoughtful discussion of the concepts of stare decisis, res judicata and
collateral estoppel as they affect an arbitrator's decision making process see the dis-
cussion of Arbitrator Boehm in Timkin Roller Bearing Co., 32 Lab. Arb. 595, 597-600
(1958) (Boehm, Arb.).
71. Brewers Board of Trade, Inc., 38 Lab. Arb. 679 (1962) (Turkus, Arb.) (will
follow prior award unless "clearly and significantly wrong"); Mississippi Lime Co., 32
Lab. Arb. 1013 (1959) (Hilpert, Arb.) (will follow prior award unless it was "egre-
giously in error"). This school of arbitration thought is not too far removed from the
United States Supreme Court's rationale in Alexander. See note 53 and accompany-
ing text supra.
72. Union-Tribune Publishing Co., 51 Lab. Arb. 421, 428 (1968) (Jones, Arb.);
Yellow Cab. Co., 44 Lab. Arb. (1965) (Jones, Arb.); Hotpoint Co., 23 Lab. Arb. 562
(1954) (Baab, Arb.). Many of these decisions which reject any binding effect of a prior
decision would reach the same conclusion if normal preclusive effect reasoning were
applied. For instance, in Yellow Cab Co. the decision of the unemployment compen-
sation referee was issued the same day as the arbitrator's initial decision. Since the
decision was not final, it should have had no preclusive effect. Similarly in Union-
Tribune, the decision of the unemployment compensation agency was made by a
claims examiner, not proper process under the state statute which provided for exam-
ination under oath and the right of cross-examination. This type of administrative
determination would not be of the type entitled to preclusive effect. See note 49
supra.
73. FAIRWEATHER, supra note 39, at 211 quoting Lord Kenyon.
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phrased in the traditional res judicata-collateral estoppel ter-
minology or in a hybrid designation such as "appropriate
weight," or "so long as it is not clearly repugnant to the Act"
the end result may be the same."4 The fact that a prior trier of
fact has decided a matter in a particular manner may tend to
influence the subsequent adjudicator, if no more than in a
psychological manner.7 5 In these circumstances the unemploy-
ment compensation hearing will have a significance far be-
yond the hearing room where the claim is litigated. 6
74. See note 64 supra.
75. Vestal, Rational of Preclusion, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J. 29, 33 (1964). Professor Ves-
tal focuses on subsequent courts respecting the decisions of early courts. This author
urges in Part IV, infra, that this same respect be provided the unemployment com-
pensation proceeding.
76. State courts have had varied success in sorting out the concepts of res judicata
(or claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (or issue preclusion) as those concepts
relate to the effect of unemployment compensation adjudication on subsequent pro-
ceedings. A certain amount of the problem is the responsibility of counsel in not dis-
tinguishing between the two concepts or making their argument on a claim preclusion
basis when issue preclusion may be more appropriate. Courts which have grappled
with the issue fairly successfully include Walsh v. Pluess-Staufer (North American),
Inc., 67 Misc. 2d 885, 325 N.Y.S.2d 19 (1971); Silberman v. Penn Gen. Agencies of
N.Y., Inc., 63 A.D.2d 929, 406 N.Y.S.2d 93 (1978); Bernstein v. Birch Wathen School,
71 A.D.2d 129, 421 N.Y.S.2d 574 (1979); Standard Automotive Parts Co. v. Michigan
Employment Security Comm'n, 3 Mich. App. 561, 143 N.W.2d 135 (1966) (NLRB
Regional Director's decision not given preclusion effect). Courts which have failed to
grapple with this issue, or which have done so poorly, include Pratt v. Film Techni-
cians of Motion Picture & T.V. Indus. Local 683, 260 Cal. App. 2d 545, 67 Cal. Rptr.
483 (1968) (failure to distinguish between concepts of res judicata and collateral es-
toppel); Cross v. Hoffa, 368 Mich. 671, 118 N.W.2d 991 (1962) (failure to recognize
concept of collateral estoppel); Salt Creek Freightways v. Wyoming Fair Empl. Prac-
tices Comm'n, 598 P.2d 435 (Wyo. 1979) (discussed concepts of res judicata and col-
lateral estoppel, but applied wrong test even though result may not have changed if
proper test applied). For cases applying preclusion in the unemployment compensa-
tion proceeding from a prior labor adjudication see Peak v. State Dep't of Indus.
Relations, 340 So. 2d 796 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976) (NLRB proceedings - court incor-
rectly applied preclusion rules although correct result reached); City of Hialeah Gar-
dens v. Prieto, 353 So. 2d 200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (state court proceeding -
court applied proper test).
Federal courts have fared little better in applying these elusive principles. Exam-
ples of courts successfully interpreting and applying the principes with respect to
unemployment cases include Lewis v. I.B.M., 393 F. Supp. 305 (D.Ore. 1974); Woods
v. Bulova Watch Co., [1980] 88 Lab. Cas. 1 12,045 Contra, Tipler v. E.I. duPont
deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971) (informed discussion of res judicata
and collateral estoppel, but decision based on claim preclusion rather than issue
preclusion).
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C. Intangible Effects Upon Subsequent Proceedings
The procedural effects discussed above can have signifi-
cant consequences on particular cases as the facts in each case
dictate. In a greater sense - although certainly more difficult
to quantify or qualify - the unemployment compensation
proceeding may set the "tone" of future proceedings between
the parties. If the unemployment compensation proceedings
draw the parties together their differences may be resolved
without the need of future proceedings. If the parties are an-
tagonistic to each other, the gap may widen. Since the unem-
ployment compensation proceeding generally will be the first
proceeding where the parties meet in an adversarial role, the
importance of establishing the future litigation stance be-
tween the parties cannot be minimized. This may be the op-
portunity to resolve completely the dispute between the par-
ties, or it may be the situation to demonstrate to the other
party that they will have to litigate every inch of the way. It
may be the opportunity to minimize the dispute and contain
it to the unemployment compensation proceedings, or it may
be the time to demonstrate the seriousness and overall ramifi-
cations of the matter to the other side.
It would be presumptuous for this article to attempt to es-
tablish the precise guidelines for these considerations. Each
case will depend upon the personalities involved, both parties
and counsel, the facts leading to the dismissal, the prior his-
tory of the parties and all similar factors which go into the
determination of a trial strategy.77 Suffice it to say, counsel
should not await the initiation of the subsequent labor litiga-
tion to establish this strategy. It should be established at or
prior to the time of the unemployment proceeding.
D. Obstacles to the Use of the Procedural Effects
The use of the evidence gathered in the unemployment
compensation proceeding in subsequent labor litigation pro-
ceedings is subject to several obstacles. As a practical matter,
the unemployment compensation proceeding may not be insti-
tuted, or brought to a hearing, if the reason for termination
does not so warrant. If an employer terminates the employee
77. See R. KEETON, TRIAL TACTICS AND METHODS §§ 1.1-.3 (2d ed. 1973); R. GIV-
ENS, ADVOCACY: THE ART OF PLEADING A CAS E 203-05 (1980).
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because the employee cannot perform the job, the employee
will be entitled to receive unemployment compensation in
most jurisdictions. This results because the employee has not
been discharged for "misconduct. ' 78 The unemployment com-
pensation statutes are designed to pay benefits to employees
who lose their employment through no fault of their own. The
inability of an employee to perform the job is not considered
to indicate the mala fides necessary to prove misconduct.
Thus, an employer who informs the unemployment compensa-
tion agency that the employee was terminated for an inability
to perform the work will have its reserve account charged for
the unemployment of the employee.7 9 If the employer ap-
pealed such a determination only in order to obtain a hearing
on the matter for the sole purpose of using the proceedings for
discovery in the subsequent labor litigation an action may lie
for abuse of process.80
A similar unavailability of opportunity may result where
the party seeking to use the proceeding for one or more of the
procedural effects stated above, prevails at the initial determi-
nation level and the adversary does not seek an appeal. For
instance, in the example immediately above, if the employee's
counsel wished to learn the basis of the claim by the employer
that the employee could not perform the work, but no appeal
was taken of the initial determination by the agency of the
grant of unemployment compensation, the employee's counsel
would never have this opportunity."'
Another obstacle to the use of the unemployment compen-
sation proceeding in the subsequent labor litigation is the pol-
icy of many of the states to consider the information gathered
in the unemployment compensation proceedings to be confi-
dential and privileged from disclosure in subsequent proceed-
78. Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249, 296 N.W. 636 (1941); Maywood
Glass Co. v. Stewart, 170 Cal. App. 2d 719, 339 P.2d 947 (1959).
79. U.S. DEP'T LABOR - COMPARISON, supra note 8, at 2-10 to 2-11.
80. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 121 (4th ed. 1971). If an attorney pursued such a
course of action ethical considerations would also arise. A.B.A., ANNOTATED CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 310-13; ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR
7-102(A)(1) & (2). Cf. Overmyer v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 554 F.2d 539, 543 n.4 (2d
Cir. 1977) (involving suit against surety on appeal bond); In re Bithoney, 486 F.2d
319 (1st Cir. 1973) (involving petitions for review in immigration cases).
81. The employee, of course, would have no grounds for appeal. See also note 80
and accompanying text supra.
1980]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
ings not involving the unemployment compensation agency.
Some states have enacted such a privilege in their statutory
framework;8 2 others have created the privilege by judicial
interpretation.8
This basis of confidentiality has led two circuit courts of
appeals to uphold the quashing of subpoenas in subsequent
National Labor Relations Board proceedings which sought to
obtain information within the files and records of the state
unemployment compensation agencies, 4 while another circuit
court of appeals refused to permit the quashing of a. subpoena
based upon a claim of confidentiality in light of ambiguous
statutory language. 5 Other cases have indicated that the con-
fidentiality is subject to waiver by a party to the proceeding.8 6
Thus, the argument is made that a party who seeks to obtain
a remedy through a legal proceeding may have waived a privi-
lege relevant to that remedy by putting the matter in issue.87
If an employee claims to have been terminated by improper
means a waiver may have occurred as to what the employee
told the unemployment compensation office about the termi-
nation. If an employer bases a defense to a claim of discrimi-
nation on one ground in the subsequent labor litigation the
employee should be able to establish through the records of
the unemployment compensation agency that the employer
based its reason for termination on another ground before
that agency.8 8
82. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 537 (Consol. Supp. 1980); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 640 (Supp.
1980).
83. Herman Bros. Pet Supply, Inc. v. NLRB, 360 F.2d 176, 179-80 (6th Cir. 1966)
(interpreting MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.511(b) prior to amendment).
84. Id.; NLRB v. Adrian Belt Co., 578 F.2d 1304, 1310 (9th Cir. 1978) (interpret-
ing the California unemployment compensation statute). The author was one of the
unsuccessful appellate counsel in this later case. See Douglas, Law Reviews and Full
Disclosure, 40 WASH. L. REV. 227, 228-30 (1965).
85. Marine Welding & Repair Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 492 F.2d 526, 530-32 (5th
Cir. 1974) (interpreting the Mississippi unemployment compensation statute).
86. Crest Catering Co. v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. 2d 274, 398 P.2d 150, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 110 (1965) (employer waived statutory privilege of confidentiality by prior
agreement with union in trust fund documents).
87. This, of course, is the argument made and generally sustained in the event of
claim of privilege of medical records by a plaintiff in an injury action wherein the
plaintiff's medical condition is in dispute and plaintiff has testified about that condi-
tion. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, supra note 45, at § 103.
88. The employee could subpoena the records of the employer instead of the un-
employment compensation agency relative to the unemployment claim, but would be
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The policies of confidentiality of the parties in order to en-
courage full disclosure by the employee and employer to the
state unemployment compensation agency of the true reason
for the termination evaporate when the parties have contin-
ued to litigate other issues arising out of the termination. 9
The interest of the state and the party who wishes the docu-
ments to remain confidential must yield to the interest of the
subsequent forum to obtain a complete picture of the circum-
stances surrounding the termination of employment. Not only
will this full disclosure permit the subsequent forum to deter-
mine whether any preclusive effect should be given the prior
unemployment compensation determination, it will also per-
mit the subsequent forum to properly sift and weigh the evi-
dence on a complete basis.
III. SUBSTANTIVE EFFECTS
The procedural effects, discussed above, of an initial un-
employment compensation proceeding on subsequent labor
litigation will vary as the facts vary. This is also true with re-
spect to the material discussed in this part. Unemployment
compensation proceedings do in many cases materially affect
the outcome of the subsequent labor litigation by permitting
the parties to extend or limit the dispute in question, impose
financial punishment upon each other or such other actions
which lessens or increases the benefit derived by the prevail-
ing party in the subsequent proceeding. The major effects can
be categorized into two principal areas: unemployment com-
subject to the same claim of privilege by the employer. It does little good to ask the
employer's representative on the witness stand the reasons given to the unemploy-
ment compensation agency for the termination if the witness has already testified to
contrary reasons, particularly where the witness knows that the employee is unable to
produce the unemployment compensation records.
89. There are justifiable reasons for keeping unemployment compenstion proceed-
ings confidential. One such reason is the employee's right of privacy with respect to
the reasons for his termination. But these reasons are secondary when the employee
and employer continue to litigate the dismissal in subsequent labor litigation. The
subsequent labor litigation tribunal could place a protective order on the release of
the information or place it under seal. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Since arbitration pro-
ceedings are private proceedings, the arbitrator should not publicly release the award
absent agreement of the parties. NAT'L ACAEMY OF ARB., Am. ARB. ASS'N & FED.
MED. & CON. SERVICE, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBMrrY FOR ARBITRATORS OF
LABOR - MANAGEMENT DispuTEs, Part II, C (Privacy of Arbitration) (April 1975).
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pensation as interim compensation, and unemployment com-
pensation as an offset to backpay.
A. Unemployment Compensation Benefits as Interim
Compensation
The award of unemployment compensation benefits as in-
terim compensation may be viewed in two aspects. The first
- an award to the employee as interim expenses until the
determination of the propriety of the employer's actions can
be tested - is filled with practicality, but little law. The sec-
ond - an award to assist the employees in a labor dispute
with their employer - has been litigated and commented
upon, ad nauseum, but has little practical effect because of
the statutory scheme in the vast majority of jurisdictions.
A terminated employee's first concern is to replace in full,
or in part, the income which is lost as a result of the termina-
tion. If this can be replaced, in part, by the unemployment
compensation benefits the employee will be assisted
financially in the subsequent labor litigation attempt to ob-
tain reemployment. If the unemployment compensation bene-
fits are denied, the employee will have suffered a double blow
to his psyche, from which he may not recover. The psychologi-
cal damage to the employee as a result of the termination may
be offset, however, in part by the award of unemployment
compensation.9" The monies received will assist the employee
in maintaining the expenses of life. It may provide sufficient
income until the employee's claim can be heard before an im-
partial tribunal.9 1 If the employee does not receive unemploy-
ment compensation he may be required to accept other em-
ployment in order to subsist. As a result the award or denial
of unemployment compensation benefits may materially affect
whether the employee proceeds with the subsequent labor
90. There appears to be no question that a discharge from employment even for
appropriate reasons results in psychological as well as economic damage to the em-
ployee. Where the discharge has been for unstated or improper reasons, the damages
are multiplied. Peck, supra note 7, at 30, 38-39.
91. Weekly benefit amounts vary greatly from state to state. U.S. DEP'T LABOR -
COMPARISON, supra note 8, at 3-35. All states have a minimum and a maximum
amount based upon a variety of factors. These include length of employment, weekly
compensation and number of dependents. Minimum weekly amounts are as low as
$5.00 (Hawaii). Maximum weekly amounts are as great as $183.00 (Connecticut).
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litigation.
Similarly, an employer who fails to dispute the employee's
claimed reason for unemployment when it is inaccurate be-
cause the employer does not want to take the time or feels
that employers never prevail before the unemployment com-
pensation agency may be adding fuel to the fire of the em-
ployee's discontent with the termination. An employee who
obtains a benefit based upon a mistaken statement of fact
may be tempted to proceed in other forums for additional
benefits. The failure of the employer to protest the employee's
claim before the unemployment compensation agency may re-
inforce the employee's belief that the discharge was without
merit.
Counsel for employees and employers should never under-
estimate the importance of an accurate determination of the
granting or denial of the unemployment compensation benefit
as it affects the ability of the employee to sustain the eco-
nomic and psychological strains of the subsequent labor litiga-
tion. An employee who has not received any income for a six
month period may be more willing to settle the subsequent
proceeding for a smaller amount than an employee who has
been receiving unemployment compensation benefits during
the interim. Other instances of the effects of the unemploy-
ment compensation award are not hard to imagine.92
The second area of significance of unemployment compen-
sation benefits as interim compensation involves a factual sit-
uation different from the discharge hypothetical used up to
this point in this article. This new factual situation involves
the use by the employees or the employer of economic force,
such as the strike or lockout, to prevail in a labor dispute. If
the employees can receive unemployment compensation bene-
fits for the duration of the work stoppage they will be in a
stronger position to resist compromising their position. In ad-
dition, if the employer's unemployment compensation account
is charged with the benefits paid to the employees, the em-
92. Settlement of any proceeding will depend upon numerous factors including
the tone of the proceedings. See note 77 and preceding text supra. Some employees
who have been denied unemployment compensation may be less willing to settle be-
cause they feel that the employer's actions involved in the denial were wilful and
malicious, where if the employer had not vigorously protested the claim of benefits
the employees would be more willing to settle.
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ployer will suffer an additional economic cost as a result of the
work stoppage.93 This additional cost may cause an employer
to abandon its refusal to accept the union's solution to the
dispute. A different issue arises in the event of an employer
lockout.
Whether a particular state agency will award unemploy-
ment compensation benefits as a result of an employer lockout
varies from state to state, lockout to lockout. One state has a
statutory provision excluding payments in the event of a lock-
out.94 Other states have formulated such a rule by administra-
tive or judicial decision.9 5 Other states determine whether the
lockout is offensive or defensive, awarding unemployment
compensation benefits for the former but not the latter.96 Sev-
eral states by statute or judicial decision award benefits to
employees in the event of any lockout regardless of its strate-
gic label.9 7 An award of unemployment compensation by the
93. Haggart, Unemployment Compensation During Labor Disputes, 37 NEB. L.
REV. 668, 689 (1958). These costs can be substantial. One New York telephone com-
pany as a result of a seven month strike by its employees was charged approximately
$16,000,000 extra over what it would have been charged had no strike occurred. New
York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Lab., 440 U.S. 519, 524-25 n.4 (1979). The
employees of the company and three other telephone companies, a total of 38,000
employees, received about $43,000,000 in unemployment compensation. Id.
94. ALA. CODE § 25-4-78(1) (1975). The definition of labor disputes includes "any
controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment . . . ." Only Ala-
bama and Minnesota define the term "labor dispute" in their unemployment com-
pensation code. U.S. DEP'T LABOR - COMPARISON, supra note 8, at 4-10.
95. Smith v. Michigan Empl. Security Comm'n, 410 Mich. 231, 301 N.W.2d 285
(1981); Buchholz v. Cummins, 6 I1. 2d 382, 128 N.E.2d 900 (1955); Adkins v. Indiana
Empl. Security Div., 117 Ind. App. 132, 70 N.E.2d 31 (1946); A.J. Sweet of La Crosse,
Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 16 Wis. 2d 98, 114 N.W.2d 141 (1962); and other cases
cited in Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 437, 485-86 (1975).
96. Compare Bunny's Waffle Shop, Inc. v. California Empl. Comm'n, 24 Cal. 2d
735, 151 P.2d 224 (1944), with McKinley v. California Empl. Stab. Comm'n, 34 Cal.
2d 239, 209 P.2d 602 (1949). Michigan Tool Co. v. Michigan Empl. Security Comm'n,
346 Mich. 673, 78 N.W.2d 571 (1956) (since employer did not prove slow down by
employees, two week lockout of employees was not a labor dispute); Salenius v. Mich-
igan Empl. Security Comm'n, 33 Mich. App. 228, 189 N.W.2d 764 (1971); but see
Smith v. Michigan Empl. Security Comm'n, 410 Mich. 231, 301 N.W.2d 285 (1981).
An offensive lockout is one precipitated by the employer in order to bring economic
pressure on the union. A defensive lockout occurs where the employees are locked out
because it is reasonably feared that a strike called by the union at a time chosen by
the union will result in inordinate harm to the employer. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON
LABOR LAW, 355-60 (1976).
97. Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi,
New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota and West Virginia.
U.S. DEP'T LABOR - COMPARISON, supra note 8, at 4-41 and 4-42, col. 7. This compar-
ison states that California and Utah by judicial interpretation have excluded lockouts
from the labor dispute category, thus entitling employees to receive benefits. That
[Vol. 64:133
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
state unemployment compensation agency to the employees in
the labor dispute will materially affect the employees' ability
to withstand the employer's economic attack. Denial of the
benefits, even though the employee may be receiving strike
benefits, 8 may force the employees to compromise or surren-
der their position prior to an employer capitulation. Contrari-
wise, an award of the benefit when it is charged to the em-
ployer's reserve account will give the employer additional
incentives to settle the dispute and return the employees to
work.9 1
Prior to 1979 many courts, legal observers and scholars,
felt that state intervention into the labor dispute arena was an
impermissible state interference into collective bargaining and
preempted by federal labor law policy.100 The United States
Supreme Court laid these concerns to rest in New York Tele-
phone Company v. New York State Department of Labor.101
New York Telephone did not involve a lockout; rather it in-
volved New York's statute0 2 which provided that strikers
were entitled to unemployment compensation benefits after
an eight week waiting period.103 Justice Stevens writing for a
plurality of the court '0 4 held that the New York statute did
conclusion is erroneous insofar as it interprets California law. See note 96 supra and
Interstates Brands v. Unempl. Ins. Appeals Ed., 26 Cal. 3d 770, 608 P.2d 707, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 619 (1980) wherein the California Supreme Court upheld a finding by a lower
court that a lockout was defensive in nature and no award of unemployment compen-
sation benefits should be made. The Utah courts do not appear to have gone as far as
the U.S. DEP'T LABOR - COMPARISON, supra note 8 indicates either. The courts ap-
plied, instead, the offensive-defensive test to detemine whether employees will receive
unemployment compensation in the event of a lockout. Olof Nelson Constr. Co. v.
Indus. Comm'n, 121 Utah 525, 243 P.2d 951 (1952); Teamsters Local 222 & 976 v.
Orange Transp. Co., 5 Utah 2d. 45, 296 P.2d 291 (1956).
98. Strike benefits are seldom more than $50 per week.
99. See note 93 supra; Ohio Bureau of Empl. Serv. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 492
(1977).
100. Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 475 F.2d 449 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
858, 879 (1973); Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. Hawaii Dep't of Labor, 405 F. Supp. 275 (D.
Hawaii 1975), reo'd, 614 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1980); Dow Chemical Co. v. Taylor, 57
F.R.D. 105 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
101. 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
102. N.Y. LAB. LAw § 590 (7) (McKinney 1978).
103. This resulted because there is a standard one week waiting period combined
with an additional seven week waiting period because of the labor dispute. 440 U.S.
at 523.
104. Consisting of Justices Stevens, White and Rehnquist. Justice Brennan filed a
concurring opinion expressing reservations concerning the preemption rationale of
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not impermissibly interfere with national labor relations pol-
icy. This was based upon the legislative history of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act and Title IX of the Social Security
Act taken together with the important state interest of pro-
viding for unemployed workers. 10 5 Justice Powell writing for
the dissent 16 felt that the statute did impermissibly distort
the federal labor policy of free collective bargaining.107
New York Telephone has had limited immediate effect
since only Rhode Island has a similar statute.l08 All other
states prohibit payment to strikers at least as of the time of
the initial work stoppage. 09 There appears to be no question,
however, that it has quieted those critics of the constitutional-
ity of payment of unemployment benefits to employees who
are locked out."l0 New York Telephone will give impetus to
labor organizations which seek changes of state laws to pro-
vide unemployment benefits to employees on strike."' If
states respond to such lobbying pressure, or are required to
comply with federal standards requirements," 2 an award of
the plurality. Id. at 546-47. Justice Blackmun and Marshall concurred, but disagreed
with the analysis of the plurality concerning pre-emption. Id. at 547-51.
105. Id. at 540-46.
106. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Stewart.
107. 440 U.S. at 567.
108. Id. at 534 n.24. See also Shadur, Unemployment Benefits and the "Labor
Dispute" Disqualification, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 294, 317 n.100 (1950) [hereinafter cited
as Shadur] which is the leading article in this area. Other articles include Williams,
The Labor Dispute Disqualification-A Primer and Some Problems. 8 VAND. L. REV.
338 (1955); Haggart, Unemployment Compensation During Labor Disputes, 37 NEB.
L. REV. 668 (1958). Cases are compiled at Annot., 62 A.L.R.3d 437 (1975). For an
interesting, although outdated, survey on a comparison of the effects of labor disputes
in eight North Central and middle Atlantic states see R. LEWIS, UNEMPLOYMENT COM-
PENSATION LAW IN LABOR DISPUTES (1964). See generally A. THIEBOLT & COWIN, WEL-
FARE AND STRIKES, THE USE OF PUBLIc FUNDS TO SUPPORT STRIKES (1972). For a criti-
cism of the New York statute including the claim that the statute is causing
businesses to leave New York see, Comment, Labor Controversies and Unemploy-
ment Compensation, 36 ALBANY L. REV. 95, 102-03 (1971). But see note 113 infra,
wherein the actual experience of New York may indicate that the cost to employers
has been de minimis.
109. U.S. DEP'T LABoR-COMPARISON, supra note 8, at 4-11.
110. If an award of unemployment compensation to a voluntary striker is not pre-
empted, an award to an employee "locked out," whether for offensive or defensive
reasons, would not be preempted.
111. Chaikin Statement, supra note 26, at 383-84.
112. While early federal reports did recommend such action, Shadur, supra note
108, at 317 n.100, the National Commisson on Unemployment Compensation has not
sought to modify the labor dispute disqualification in its recent hearings. 44 Fed. Reg.
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unemployment compensation benefits may materially affect
the balance of power between employees and their employers,
particularly if the waiting time limitation for benefits to com-
mence is reduced.11 s
This is not to suggest that states, or the federal govern-
ment, do not have strong and legitimate reason why employ-
ees should receive unemployment benefits for an extended
work stoppage even if the employer is in part financing such
payments. The employees could, of course, receive such pay-
ments and the employer's account would not be charged with
such payments. 14 The potential preemption impediments
having been removed by New York Telephone, the role of un-
employment compensation benefits as an aid to employees in-
volved in a labor dispute with their employer has been sub-
stantially enhanced. States need now only tackle the difficult
political problems of whether, and if so to what extent, they
wish to re-enter the fray.
B. Unemployment Compensation Benefits and the Award
of Back Pay
One area of the interrelationship of unemployment com-
pensation proceedings and subsequent labor litigation has
been litigated in depth. This involves the question of whether
an award of unemployment compensation benefits may be
used as an offset, or credit, to a subsequent award of back pay
in the subsequent labor litigation proceeding. Only in the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board's arena has the answer been def-
initely resolved.
40, 983 (1979) (proposal lE reads "No benefits would be paid to an individual or
strike"). The report of the Commission is due to be released mid-year 1980.
113. See note 99, supra. There is a strong contrary argument that an award of
benefits to strikers where there is a waiting period will not increase the length of the
strike. A witness before the National Commission on Unemployment Compensation
stated that based upon a twenty-six year period (1947 through 1972) in New York
only 9.3% of the workers engaged in labor disputes ever received benefits and that
the cost to employers was only .02% of taxable payrolls and only .01% of total pay-
rolls. Chaiken Statement, supra note 26, at 384.
114. For instance, the payment of unemployment benefits in the event of a strike
could come from all employers in the state, i.e., a charge against the entire state fund
instead of a particular employer's fund. Another alternative would be to make the
payments from the general tax fund of the state, shifting the burden of payment to
the public.
1980]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
In NLRB v. Gullet Gin Co., 11 5 the United States Supreme
Court held that it was not an abuse of discretion for the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board to refuse to deduct unemploy-
ment compensation benefits from its back pay order. The
court held that the benefits were in the nature of a collateral
benefit for which the Board did not have to give credit.""' The
court held the action of the Board to be within the frame
work of discretion given the Board to effectuate the policies of
the National Labor Relations Act. 117 As a result, the Board's
concept has enjoyed limited success as a standard in federal
court proceedings in the context of awarding back pay in
equal employment litigation.
Some federal courts have adopted in toto the National La-
bor Relations Board's policy decision to give no credit to un-
employment compensation benefits when calculating back
pay. 1 8 These courts, by and large, adopt the Board's theory
that unemployment compensation benefits are a collateral
source. Other courts have ordered deductions of the amount
of compensation, sometimes on the theory that the plans are
funded with employer's contributions," 9 other times without
explanation.12 0 A third group of courts have not given the em-
115. 340 U.S. 361 (1951). This was the culmination of a change of policy by the
Board. Initially the Board had required the employer to reimburse the state unem-
ployment compensation fund for the amount of the benefits received by the em-
ployee. Hanover Cordage Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 507, 509, 4 L.R.R.M. 162 (1939). This pol-
icy was subsequently abandoned and no deductions for unemployment compensation
were made. Pennsylvania Furnace & Iron Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 49, 55, 4 L.R.R.M. 269
(1939). The Court in Gullet Gin recognized the concept of reimbursement by the
employee to the state fund but did not mention the interest of the employer to have
its account relieved of the charge. 340 U.S. at 365 n.1.
116. 340 U.S. at 364. The rationale of the Court is questionable in light of the
non-contribution of the employee in most jurisdictions. Comment, The Mitigating
Effect on Damages of Social Welfare Programs, 63 HARv. L. REv. 330, 335-36 (1949).
The comment concludes that while the payment of the unemployment compensation
is not a collateral source for the employee the policy of the unemployment copensa-
tion program requires that the state fund be first reimbursed from the back pay the
amount it has paid to the employee with the remainder to go to the employee.
117. 340 U.S. at 364.
118. Scofield v. Bolts & Bolts Retail Stores, Inc., [1979] Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH)
(20 Empl. Prac. Dec.) T 30,242; Abron v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 439 F. Supp. 1095,
1115 (D. Md. 1977); Inda v. United Air Lines, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 426, 435 (N.D. Cal.
1975).
119. EEOC v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 542 F.2d 579, 591-92 (2d
Cir. 1976).
120. Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394, 401 (3d Cir. 1976); Bowe v.
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ployers credit for the payments, but have required the em-
ployees to reimburse the state for unemployment compensa-
tion benefits received from the back pay awarded.121
Arbitrators, like the federal courts, are not consistent in
their treatment of unemployment compensation benefits as a
credit to back pay. Some arbitrators follow the policy of the
National Labor Relations Board and refuse to give credit;'22
others feel that the position of the arbitrator is to make the
employee whole pursuant to rules of contract which require
credit to be given for these payments. 12 3 A few arbitrators give
credit to the employer for unemployment compensation re-
ceived by the employee, but require that the employer reim-
burse the state agency. 24
Because neither the federal courts nor arbitrators apply a
consistent rule, situations may occur wherein inequitable re-
sults transpire. The same federal district court may apply a
different rule dependent upon which judge is assigned the
case. 12 5 An arbitrator will give credit to the employer for the
payment to the employee of the unemployment compensation,
but the state will require the employee to make a reimburse-
ment to the state,'26 an abhorrent result to the employee. The
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 721 (7th Cir. 1969); EEOC v. Kallir, Philips,
Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Alexander v. Avco Corp., 380 F.
Supp. 1282, 1284 (M.D. Tenn. 1974).
121. Pedreyra v. Cornell Prescription Pharmacies, Inc., [1979] Empl. Prac. Guide
(CCH) (19 Empl. Prac. Dec.) 6228; EEOC v. Pacific Press Publ. Ass'n, 482 F. Supp.
1291, 1318 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
122. National Linen Service, 74 Lab. Arb. 857 (1980) (Dunn, Arb.); Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Co., 62 Lab. Arb. 1213 (1974) (Davis, Arb.); Union Carbide Corp., 56
Lab. Arb. 707 (1971) (William, Arb.); International Harvester Co., 16 Lab. Arb. 376
(1951) (Seward, Arb.).
123. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 336, 338-39 (1965) (Tsukiyama, Arb.). See
also Orlando Transit Co., 71 Lab. Arb. 897, 903 (1978) (Serot, Arb.); Supreme Wire &
Metal Prod. Co., 58 Lab. Arb. 531, 533 (1972) (Kelliher, Arb.); Falls Stamping &
Welding Co., 48 Lab. Arb. 107, 115 (1967) (Dworkin, Arb.); and Nestle Co. Inc., 45
Lab. Arb. 524, 529 (1965) (Traynor, Arb.) providing for a deduction of unemployment
compensation received by the employee.
124. Universal Producing Co., 57 Lab. Arb. 1072 (1971) (Sembower, Arb.); Amer-
ican Bakeries Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 1106, 1111 (1964) (Purdom, Arb.). Arbitrator
Sembower captures the essence of the problem in the Universal decision and resolves
the matter in an equitable manner for all concerned.
125. Compare Inda v. United Air Lines, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 426, 435 (N.D. Cal.
1975) with EEOC v. Pacific Press Publ. Ass'n, 482 F. Supp. 1291, 1318 (N.D. Cal.
1979).
126. Griggs v. Sands, - Tenn. -, 526 S.W.2d 441 (1975); Texas Empl. Comm'n v.
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concept of reimbursement to the state is, of course, the most
equitable approach from the interest of the employee, the em-
ployer and the state.127 By requiring reimbursement, the em-
ployee does not receive more money than he would have re-
ceived if he had kept working. The employer's reserve account
is credited and it is not charged with an event of unemploy-
ment in which the employee receives back pay. The state re-
ceives back its disbursement and protects the financial sound-
ness of its unemployment compensation fund. No party
receives a benefit or incurs a detriment to which it is not
entitled or obligated.
An employee who does not receive full back pay because
the trier of fact gives the employer credit for unemployment
compensation should seek to have the trier of fact require
that the employer reimburse the state in order that the em-
ployee is not later required by the state to make reimburse-
ment.128 An employer who does not receive credit for unem-
ployment compensation in the calculation of back pay should
seek to have the trier of fact require the employee to make
repayment to the state. 29 If the trier of fact refuses, the em-
ployer or employee can notify the state that the other has re-
ceived back pay, or credit thereon, and ask, as the case may
be, that the state obtain reimbursement from the employee
and relieve the employer's account from liability for that in-
stance of unemployment or proceed against the employer for
reimbursement. i30 Alternatively, an employer may attempt to
Busby, 457 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970); Meyers v. Director of Div. of Empl.
Security, 341 Mass. 79, 167 N.E.2d 160 (1960); In re Skutnik, 268 App. Div. 357, 51
N.Y.S.2d 711 (1944). Contra, Waters v. Maryland, 220 Md. 337, 152 A.2d 811 (1959).
The Griggs decision and the concept of deduction of unemployment compensation
from back pay is criticized in Youngdahl, Deducting Unemployment Compensation
from Back Pay: Erosion of a Rational Policy, 28 LAB. L.J. 587 (1977).
127. But not every state requires reimbursement absent fraud. Eleven states pro-
vide that, absent fraud, misrepresentation or nondisclosure, an individual will not be
responsible for reimbursement where it would defeat the purposes of the unemploy-
ment compensation act and be inequitable. Five other states provide recovery may be
waived under similar conditions. U.S. Dm'T LABOR - COMPARISON, supra note 8, at
4-14. See Annot., 90 A.L.R.3d 987, 1001-03 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Annot. -
Repayment].
128. See note 124 supra.
129. See note 121 supra.
130. Hiserote Homes, Inc. v. Riedemann, 277 N.W.2d 911 (Iowa 1979). In this
case the employee received reinstatement and back pay as a result of a National La-
bor Relations Board investigation. The unemployment compensation proceeding was
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issue a jointly payable check to the employee as well as the
state agency, at least for the amount of the unemployment
compensation received, to require that the employee settle the
matter with the state agency. 131
The problem of unemployment compensation as a credit
for back pay should be resolved by the parties in the event of
settlement of claims prior to issuances of formal orders or
awards. If the National Labor Relations Board agents are un-
able to work out the credit of unemployment compensation in
the settlement agreement, the parties may always settle by
withdrawing the charge and making a non-Board settle-
ment.132 If credit is given the employer for unemployment
compensation paid, the employee should protect himself, if
the employer fails to make reimbursement to the state, by re-
quiring in the settlement agreement that the employer indem-
nify and hold harmless the employee if the state ever proceeds
against the employee for reimbursement. 133
still in litigation. The employer withdrew its claim that the employee had been dis-
charged for cause and claimed ineligibility because of back pay provided in the Board
settlement. Id. at 912. The Iowa Supreme Court ruled that if unemployment compen-
sation was paid (the facts were uncertain) the employee need not reimburse the state,
but that the employer should not have its account charged. Id. at 915.
131. This is the procedure suggested by the Illinois administrator of unemploy-
ment compensation as reported in Universal Producing Co. v. Machinists Dist. Lodge
105, 57 Lab. Arb. 1072, 1073-74 (1971) (Sembower, Arb.).
132. A private settlement is not deemed to be a settlement by the National Labor
Relations Board; nor does it automatically receive Board approval. NLRB CASE-
HANDLING MANUAL §§ 10140.1, 10142 (1976). Region 7 of the National Labor Relations
Board located in Detroit, Michigan, provides in settlement agreements for less than
full back pay a clause which reads:
M.E.S.C. Clause - The parties hereto recognize that the amount of backpay
to be paid herein represents a compromise of the total amount of back pay due
the discriminatee. It is agreed, therefore, that in the event the discriminatee is
required to reimburse the Michigan Employment Security Commission for any
unemployment compensation the discriminatee received as a result of a loss of
pay because of the alleged unfair labor practices in this matter, the employer
will pay over to the Michigan Employment Security Commission an amount
equal to that which the discriminatee is required to reimburse the Michigan
Employment Security Commission. This amount, however shall not exceed
[the difference between total back pay less the settlement amount].
This clause, or language appropriate to the particular state involved, should be
adopted by the other Regional offices for use in those states requiring reimbursement
by employees to state funds, when the settlement is less than full back pay. This will
avoid the inequitable result of a double deduction mentioned in the text at note 126
supra.
133. Some states have held the employer liable, even absent an indemnity agree-
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IV. CLOSING THOUGHTS AND PROPOSALS
The intent of this article was to bring into focus the signif-
icant role which unemployment compensation proceedings
may play in the resolution of subsequent labor litigation. The
need for illumination and discussion of this subject is appar-
ent. The case authorities are inconsistent, even in the same
judicial family. Many of the decisions are based upon faulty
or misunderstood reasons.
Fifty-three jurisdictions have fifty-three different unem-
ployment compensation statutes which vary in substance and
form. While it is impossible to delineate herein the subtle dif-
ferences between these statutory schemes, these differences
often affect the application of some, or all, of the principles
previously discussed. When these principles are applied to a
particular set of facts in a particular jurisdiction, it is incum-
bent to thoroughly examine local practice and precedent.
However, certain concepts, subject to these subtle differences,
tend to vary little from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
The unemployment compensation proceeding may be use-
ful as a discovery device for the practitioner. Since neither the
National Labor Relations Board nor a majority of arbitrators
permit pre-hearing discovery the evidence adduced at the un-
employment compensation proceeding will provide valuable
insight into the adverse party's claims. Careful cross-examina-
tion at the unemployment compensation hearing will bind an
adverse witness to a certain factual setting.13 4 The advocate
through subsequent investigation may be able to demonstrate
the factual setting to be erroneous in the subsequent labor
litigation. If the adverse witness changes testimony in the sub-
sequent proceeding, the prior testimony may be used for im-
peachment purposes. In brief, the unemployment compensa-
tion proceeding may have effects far beyond that proceeding's
hearing room.
The preclusive effect - or lack thereof - of the unem-
ployment compensation adjudication applied by many of the
ment, under theories of unjust enrichment, restitution, mistake of law or as a con-
structive trustee. Annot. - Repayment, supra note 127, at 1015-16.
134. See text at notes 44-47 supra. See also 1B J. MOORE FEDERAL PRACTICE 1
0.405[81 (2d ed. 1976), for a discussion of the concept of preclusion against inconsis-
tent positions.
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courts and administrative bodies is troublesome. No one
would urge that the unemployment compensation adjudicator
should decide whether the employer has violated the National
Labor Relations Act or Title VII. 13 5 This does not mean that
the unemployment compensation decision should have no
binding effect. If a finding of fact, fully litigated (or at least
the opportunity to do so), is made which is required by the
unemployment compensation determination, that finding
should be given preclusive effect under the normal rules.1 6
Once that fact is fairly found, no purpose of jurisprudence is
served by permitting a second adjudicatory body to redeter-
mine the same fact.
If the unemployment compensation proceeding is so inher-
ently untrustworthy that preclusive principles are not applica-
ble, a redetermination of that adjudicatory process is in order.
A party should not be put to the test of submitting evidence
under penalty of perjury if that evidence is not to be accorded
significance by subsequent authorities. The rules of preclusion
adequately protect against an undue effect of the prior fact
determination in those cases where the prior adjudicator ex-
ceeded the scope of the issue before it.13 7 But errors in the
application of the system do not warrant elimination of the
system.'3 8 Only by giving the level and scope of preclusive ef-
fect to unemployment compensation adjudications, which are
warranted under normal preclusion rules, will the unemploy-
135. The unemployment compensation adjudicator may have to consider the ef-
fect of these statutes in its determination, but any such consideration would not be
binding on the second tribunal. See text at notes 50-51 supra.
136. The second tribunal would refuse to give the prior finding preclusive effect if
the standards for preclusion were not met. See note 49 supra. Preclusive principles
provide an "escape valve," at least as to questions of law, where a preclusive finding
would result in injustice. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 70 (1942); Pacific Maritime
Ass'n v. California Unempl. Ins. Appeals Bd., 236 Cal. App. 2d 325, 45 Cal. Rptr. 892,
896 (1965). To the extent that the preclusive principles should be saved a similar
sacrifice could be made with respect to questions of fact. Lewis v. I.B.M., 393 F.
Supp. 305 (D. Ore. 1974). But see Vestal - Adjudicating Bodies, supra note 49, at
888-89, wherein Professor Vestal questions the use of preclusion to administrative
agencies applying policy considerations.
137. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942).
138. "Although any particular decision must be held either binding or not bind-
ing, the choice is not between taking all or none of the traditional doctrine of res
judicata; the doctrine may be relaxed or qualified in any desired degree without de-
stroying its essential service." K. DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES §
18.12, at 625 (1976).
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ment compensation adjudications cease to be the stepchild of
the judicial system and accorded the esteem to which they are
entitled.
If the findings of the unemployment compensation adjudi-
cations were uniformly accorded the weight to which they are
entitled the level of representation of claimants would surely
rise.' Subsequent labor litigation would diminish in scope
and number if advocates understood that a prior adverse ad-
judication in the appropriate case would be binding. The al-
ternative established in Alexander140 by the United States Su-
preme Court is not an adequate substitute. By permitting the
second adjudicator to give what weight in its discretion it feels
the first adjudication should receive is to let the second adju-
dicator totally ignore or accept the prior adjudication based
upon the second adjudicator's perception of how the case
should be decided. This ad hoc approach to preclusion is a
poor substitute for the common law approach based upon the
normal test of preclusion."4
In the arena of labor arbitration, the Alexander case has
led many parties to defer arbitration either by the terms of
the agreement to arbitrate or by stipulation until after the
139. If parties to unemployment compensation proceedings realized that such an
adjudication could have preclusive effects they would be sure to have counsel present
if future litigation were planned. The idea that currently "not much is at stake" in
the unemployment compensation proceedings adds fuel to the fire of those who feel
no preclusive effect should be granted. Vestal - Adjudicating Bodies, supra note 49,
at 889 n.110. This, then, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy; since there is no incentive,
there is no preclusion which further supports a lack of incentive.
140. See note 53 supra.
141. The usual rules of preclusion would serve adequately in the Alexander fac-
tual situation. The Court focused primarily on the concept of traditional res judicata,
or claim preclusion, without adequately resolving the concept of collateral estoppel,
or issue preclusion, except by totally rejecting that concept. Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 50 (1974). The Court felt that the arbitration procedure was
not the equivalent of judicial factfinding. Id. at 57-58. An arbitration proceeding in
many states is the equivalent. See note 39 and accompanying text supra. However,
where it is not, the second adjudicatory body need not provide the prior finding a
preclusive effect since the prior proceeding does not fulfill the preclusive require-
ments. See note 49 supra. But even if the prior proceedings fit the principles of pre-
clusion "like a glove," the second tribunal could refuse to apply preclusion if injustice
would result. See note 136 supra. The Court was not presented with these concepts
since the respondent chose to modify its position on preclusion in its argument before
the Court. Brief of Respondent at 30-31, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S.
36 (1974).
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claim of discrimination has been adjudicated. 142 This process
is used to eliminate unnecessary adjudicatory proceedings
which may result in contradictory decisions. This is not possi-
ble in the unemployment compensation proceedings because
of the delay in obtaining benefits to an entitled employee.
However, the adversary nature of the benefit determination
could be eliminated in order that the question of employee
entitlement to benefits not rest upon charging the employer's
account. For instance, the employee could be automatically
entitled to benefits, with the only litigated question being
whether the employer's account would be charged. If the em-
ployer could show a sufficient reason why its account should
not be charged the benefits would be charged to the general
fund of the state. If the state could demonstrate that a good
reason existed why the employee should not receive unem-
ployment benefits, the benefits would be denied. But the two
determinations would not be interrelated.4 In brief, the un-
employment compensation proceeding should be given its dig-
nity, or relieved of its mantle of adjudicatory authority.
A common and uniform system of treatment of unemploy-
ment compensation as a set off against subsequent back pay
awards is another concept which needs implementation. The
most equitable method is for the subsequent labor litigation
adjudicator to impose, as part of the award, the requirement
that the state unemployment compensation agency be reim-
bursed any sums for periods of time in which full back pay is
awarded to the employee in those states which require reim-
142. One author takes this position one step further and urges that Title VII mat-
ters be excluded in their entirety from the arbitration process. Glanstein, Arbitration
of EEO Issues: A Dissenting View, N.Y.U. THiRTY-SECOND ANN. CONF. ON LAB. 155,
166-67 (1979). Another has suggested a "two-track" grievance procedure for handling
employment discrimination cases, although certain criticism has been lodged that this
approach does not eliminate the multiple forum problem. Edwards, Arbitration of
Employment Discrimination Cases: A Proposal for Employer and Union Represent-
atives, 27 LAB. L.J. 265 (1976); Aaron, Current Trends and Developments in Arbitra-
tion, S.W. LEGAL FOUNDATION, LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS 1978, 143, 165-68. If the
area of preclusion and labor litigation were reexamined and appropriate preclusive
principles were applied, as urged herein, the need for alternative systems of forum
resolution would, by and large, be eliminated.
143. There may still be partial issue preclusion under this procedure since even a
stranger to a prior proceeding may use a prior adjudication against an adversary in
the subsequent proceeding. Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Parties, 50
IOWA L. REv. 27, 43 passim (1964).
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bursement. The procedure of the National Labor Relations
Board under Gullet Gin is unsatisfactory from the employer's
standpoint since it puts the burden on the employer to be
sure that the employee reimburses the state in those jurisdic-
tions where reimbursement is required. The Board should re-
turn to its pre-Gullet Gin procedure.""
Unemployment compensation is not a collateral source in
the traditional sense of the term. Since the employer's ac-
count and experience rating is affected, the employer is
penalized twice if reimbursement is not made. The employee
who does not reimburse the state fund is made more than
whole. The employee who receives a deduction from back pay
because of unemployment compensation and then has to re-
imburse the state fund is penalized. Neither result comports
with equity. The policy of those courts which require the em-
ployee to reimburse the state as required, but give the em-
ployer no credit for unemployment compensation received by
the employee, protects the interest of the employee, the em-
ployer and the state unemployment fund. This approach
should be adopted by the remainder of the courts and
arbitrators. 145
Unemployment compensation boards should consider a
system of establishing a statutory or contractual lien on
claims by employees for back pay from their employers. This
could be accomplished by asking the employer to report to the
unemployment compensation agency whether any claim has
been filed by the employee for reinstatement or back pay from
the employer. If it has the unemployment compensation
agency could notify the latter forum that it was paying bene-
fits for which it had a lien in the event of an award of back
pay. 146
144. See note 115 supra.
145. See note 121 supra. This would be consistent with the practice in Great Brit-
ain where, pursuant to regulation, an employee is not entitled to unemployment ben-
efits for periods covered by an award for loss of wages in an Industrial Tribunal
award for unfair dismissal. Mesher, Unemployment Benefit and Severance Payments
- II, J. Soc. WELFARE L., 117, 120 (Mar. 1980).
146. This procedure has worked well in California with respect to the unemploy-
ment compensation payments providing the basis for a lien on subsequent worker's
compensation payments, CAL. LAB. CODE § 4903(f) (West 1971). In the present con-
text a consensual lien of the employee would better fit the framework of the problem
due to the jurisdictional differences of the subsequent adjudicatory bodies. The Social
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The problems which face labor practitioners and scholars
with respect to the interrelationship of unemployment com-
pensation proceedings, National Labor Relations Board hear-
ings, equal employment adjudication and arbitration resolu-
tion is symptomatic of the larger frustration of labor litigation
in general. A need for consistent, efficient and rapid adjust-
ment of employment claims is apparent. While partial propos-
als have been suggested,147 further discussions and ideas are
needed. To borrow a phrase from another profession, a holis-
tic approach to labor relation adjudication is needed. This ap-
proach, at the least, would resolve all factual disputes regard-
ing employment in one proceeding; at the most, it would
serve to adjudicate all claims whether workers' compensation
or unemployment compensation, equal employment or occu-
pational health and safety, wage claims or unfair labor prac-
tices. 14 8 Only by such a proceeding may the repetitious, waste-
ful and inconsistent present system be eliminated.
Security Act's disability insurance benefit payments provide for an analogous reduc-
tion in the event of receipt of payments from the workers compensation program. 42
U.S.C. § 424a (1976).
147. Bartosic, Labor Law Reform-The NLRB and a Labor Court, 4 GA. L. REv.
647 (1970); Morris, The Case for Unitary Enforcement of Federal Labor Law, 26 Sw.
L.J. 471 (1972).
148. The present system not only leads to inconsistent, inefficient and delayed
adjustment of employee claims, it may encourage additional litigation. In Boudreaux
v. Vulcan Materials Co., 485 F. Supp. 347 (E.D. Wis. 1980) the discharged employee
attempted to have his January 5, 1977 termination arbitrated. After investigation by
the union, the union withdrew the grievance on January 10, 1977 and refused to take
the matter to arbitration. On January 12, 1977 the employee filed a charge with the
National Labor Relations Board against the union. After the investigation the em-
ployee, faced with a dismissal of the charge, withdrew it. In November of 1977 the
employee prevailed in the unemployment compensation hearing. When the union re-
fused to reopen the matter the employee filed a federal action against the employer
and union, respectively, for breach of contract and breach of duty of fair representa-
tion pursuant to section 301 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). This occurred in
June of 1978. In February of 1980, over three years after the discharge, the federal
district court granted the union's and employer's motions for summary judgment.
The employee had spent three years attempting four different forums concerning the
question of his discharge. The success of the employee before the unemployment
compensation agency had erroneously led the employee to believe that the union had
not properly represented him. This led to additional needless litigation. See also
Bavin v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 464 F. Supp. 622, 624 n.1 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (em-
ployee processed claim through grievance, NLRB, unemployment, state and federal
equal employment proceedings). A single adjudicatory labor forum would avoid such
repetitious litigation.

